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Workplace safety is under serious threat due to the increasing trend of active shooter violence
in recent years. Therefore, it becomes essential that the safety of a workplace is rigorously
and, most importantly, methodologically assessed against active shooter violence. To serve this
purpose, this study proposes a machine learning-optimization framework to assess the safety of a
building against possible active shooter violence. First, several state-of-the-art machine learning
models are employed to predict an agent’s movement decisions (with directions) under different
violence scenarios. The predictions are then utilized in a mixed-integer linear programming model
to maximize the agent’s utility under a possible active shooter violence situation. The machine
learning models and the proposed optimization model considered several building-specific (e.g.,
staircase/hiding room capacities, building orientation) and agent-specific (e.g., herding behavior,
cognitive delay) attributes to realistically capture the violent situation. The performance of the
proposed machine learning-optimization framework is assessed on a two-storied test building.
Results indicate that the building configuration (e.g., number and location of the staircases, hiding

rooms, exits) as well as agent behaviors, such as herding behavior and cognitive delay, play an
important role in the recovery/casualty of civilians under a crisis situation.
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CHAPTER I
REVIEW OF ACTIVE SHOOTER INCIDENTS IN ACADEMIC ENVIRONMENT: LESSONS
LEARNED AND FUTURE IMPLICATIONS

1.1

Introduction
The US Department of Homeland Security defines Active Shooter (AS) violence as “An

individual actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a confined and populated area;
in most cases, active shooters use firearm(s), and there is no pattern or method to their selection
of victim” [1]. Even with significant improvements in developing different training modules or
violence mitigation technologies, the frequency of active shooter violence and the resultant casualty
rate have increased significantly over the last decades. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
[113] reported 277 active shooter violence between 2000 and 2018, resulting in 884 and 1,546
people killed and wounded, respectively. The FBI further reported that the active shooter violence
escalated to 21.2 incidents/year between 2011 and 2018 compared to 8.6 incidents/year between
2000 and 2010. The United States witnessed the highest active shooter violence (417 occurrences)
in a given calendar year in 2019. Even more alarming than the frequency of incidents is the
increase in the number of casualties resulting from active shooter violence. In 2000-2010, the
average number of casualties was recorded just over 60 per year, which increased to 196 per year
between 2011 and 2018. Further, a large portion of the violence occurred in public places, where
the civilians are not allowed to carry firearms (e.g., businesses and shopping malls (43.7%), Pre-K
1

to 12 schools (14.8%), universities (6%), health care facilities (4.3%), churches (4%), and others
(0.4%)). With such an increase in active shooter violence, especially in an academic environment,
it becomes imperative to learn from the past violence and identify the pressing areas that require
immediate attention by the research communities.
Active shooter violence can be characterized as capricious, rapidly developing, and with the
intent of mass killings in a shorter time frame. As such, this violence category can be marked
distinct compared to other extreme events, such as fires or earthquakes (e.g., presence of weapons,
the intent to harm, shortness of duration). Further, every active shooter violence is distinctive with
respect to its location (open space (e.g., The 2017 Las Vegas shooting) vs. confined space (e.g.,
The 2018 Stoneman Douglas High School (Parkland) shooting)), the intent of the shooter (targeted
shooting (e.g., The 2000 University of Arkansas shooting) vs. random shooting (e.g., The 2012
Sandy Hook Elementary School shooting)), the number of the shooters (single (e.g., The 2007
Virginia Tech shooting) vs. multiple (e.g., The 1999 Columbine High School massacre)), the type
of firearm used (manual (e.g., The 2012 Sandy Hook Elementary School shooting) vs. automatic
or semiautomatic pistol (e.g., The 2008 Northern Illinois University shooting) or rifle/shotgun),
and many others. Lastly, the data is ordinarily unattainable to the population at large, and at times a
general description of events is not released either. All the above unique aspects make it extremely
difficult to fully understand or even model any active shooter violence situation.
Research on active shooter violence in an academic environment probably started on November
12, 1840, when a law professor at the University of Virginia was fatally shot (died 3 days later)
by one of his students [4]. This was also the first-ever recorded active shooter violence held in
any school infrastructure or campus in the United States. However, The 1999 Columbine school
2

shooting can be considered as one of the most tragic incidents in the United States history that
let the policymakers and law enforcement officers feel for the first time that such incidents can
happen in any community and cannot continue to be unprepared for such situations. Following
this incident, specialized civilian training programs, such as the RHF (RUN.HIDE.FIGHT.®),
ADD (Avoid, Deny, DefendTM) programs, are introduced. A number of statistics/case-based
reports have started to publish periodically, primarily by the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS), Texas State University (TSU), and Purdue Homeland Security Institute (PHSI). Realizing
the need and challenges associated with modeling active shooter violence scenarios, researchers
predominantly use an agent-based simulation approach (AnyLogic® simulation software) to mimic
an AS exposed environment [137, 62, 157, 127]. For instance, mitigation strategies such as RHF
[88, 87, 22] and automatic door locking system can be modeled and visualized with the help of
an agent-based simulation model. Additionally, a few studies attempted to simulate the past active
shooter incidents, such as the 2012 movie theater shooting in Aurora, Colorado [62] , and the 2017
Las Vegas shooting [88], to derive meaningful insights. To the end, different policies, such as the
effectiveness of Senator Feinstein’s bill to regulate assault weapons and magazine capacity [62],
and scenarios, such as the no security/security guard/concealed carry gun scenario [77]; automatic
door locking system; civilian evacuation time and firearm discharge rate by the shooter and police
[88]; cognitive delay [137], can be analyzed and assessed using an agent-based simulation model.
Zhu et al. [157] adopted a virtual reality (VR) based approach to study human-building interactions
following an active shooter incident. A few other researchers evaluate the effectiveness of text and
email warning messages and security cameras in responding to active shooter violence [127, 128].
Most recently, Marufuzzaman et al. [107] and Aghalari et al.[5] developed optimization models
3

and inverse reinforcement learning approaches to understand how civilians behave under an active
shooter incident. Finally, several studies qualitatively discuss different AS mitigation and response
strategies, however, specifically for a health care application [73, 80, 109, 126, 78] [133-137], and
a focus-group interview to understand possible building countermeasures for proofing a building
against AS incidents [160].
This study aims to gain insights from past active shooter violence taken place in an academic environment (e.g., primary/middle/high schools, community colleges, and universities) in the United
States between 1999 and 2019. By dissecting the data set, we derive a number of managerial
insights about different critical parameters (e.g., age groups, ethnicity, violence trends, school
environments, critical months, and locations with correlation with other factors (e.g., weapons)),
which may help decision-makers developing new tools/policies to protect our academic environments from the growing threats and the casualties that resulted from such an incident. Finally, a
few pressing areas are identified that require immediate attention by the research communities.
The exposition of this manuscript is as follows. Section 1.2 summarizes the collected data for
active shooter violence in an academic environment between 1999 to 2019. Section 1.3 derives
a number of key lessons by dissecting the collected data. Section 1.4 introduces a few pressing
areas for future research directions. Finally, Section 1.5 concludes by summarizing the key lessons
learned from this study.

1.2

Data Collection
This study collected a panel of active shooter data that took place in an academic environment

between January 1, 1999, and December 31, 2019. By academic environment, we specifically mean
4

if the active shooter incident (discharge of a firearm’s projectile) occurred in one of the following
environments (e.g., school campus or school property): (i) primary school (prekindergarten to 3
and a high grade of 8 or lower); (ii) middle school (low grade of 4 to 7 and a high grade of 9 or
lower); (iii) high school (7 to 12 grade); (iv) community college (post-secondary schools that offer
two-year programs or preparation to transfer to four-year universities); and (v) university (postsecondary schools that offer 4-year degrees and graduate studies). In total, 267 incidents were
cataloged. The collected data for the incidents are categorized into three major types: (i) firearmrelated data, (ii) event-related data, and (iii) location statistics data. The firearm-related data were
collected from the Center for Homeland Defense and Security’s school shooting database and the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) website. Each incident/event-related
data was collected from the Center for Homeland Defense and Security’s school shooting database
and the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) active shooter resources . Finally, all the location
statistics for the schools were obtained from the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES)
and the Census Bureau’s websites.
We collected several features of each incident, such as incident date (day, month, and year),
location (city, state, and zip code), classification of the school, number of students in the school,
gender and ethnicity of the students and attacker, age of the attacker, Full-Time Equivalent (FTE)
teachers (number of teachers expected to work a full-time schedule), pupil/teacher ratio, national
firearm act registered weapons in the state during the time the shooting event occurred, casualties
(number of deaths and injuries), and the type of the firearm used (e.g., pistol, rifle, shotgun) during
the incident. Note that we classify the schools into 5 major categories: primary school, middle
school, high school, community college, and university. Primary School is defined as a school
5

offering a low grade of prekindergarten to 3 and a high grade of 8 or lower. Middle School is defined
as a school offering a low grade of 4 to 7 and a high grade of 9 or lower. High School is defined as a
school offering a 7 to 12 grade. Community college is defined as post-secondary schools that offer
two-year programs or preparation to transfer to four-year universities. Universities are defined as
post-secondary schools that offer 4-year degrees and graduate studies. A summary of the features
and their definition is provided in Table 1.1.
Table 1.1
Definitions of the Features
Feature
Event Date
Event Location
School Classification

Number of Students
Gender
Student/Attacker Ethnicity
Attacker Age
Full-Time Equivalent
(FTE) Teachers
Pupil/Teacher Ratio
National Firearm ACT
Registered Weapons
Causalities
Firearm Type

Definition
Day;Month;Year
School Name and Location (City,State,and Zip code)
Primary School (Prekindergarten to 3 and a High Grade of 8 or Lower)
Middle School (Low Grade of 4 to 7 and a High Grade of 9 or Lower)
High School (7 to 12 Grade)
Community College( Post-Secondary Schools That Offer Two-Year Programs or
Preparation to Transfer to Four-Year Universities)
University (Post-Secondary Schools that Offer 4-Year Degrees and Graduate Studies)
Total Number of Students at the School
Male ; Female
American Indian/Alaska Native ; Asian or Asian/Pacific Islander ; Hispanic ; Black;
White: Hawaiian Native/Pacific Islander ; Two or More Races
Age of the Attacker
Number of Teachers Expected to Work a Full-Time Schedule
Number of Students/FTE Teachers
Number of Weapons Registered in State at a Given Year
Number of Deaths and Injuries Per Incident
Type of Firearm Used by the Attacker

Among the 267 collected incident records, the majority of the incidents occurred in the high
school (51.5%), followed by university (25.2%), middle school (11.5%), community college (6.1%),
and primary school (5.7%). The schools from these incidents had a mean full-time equivalent (FTE)
of 67.7 and a pupil-to-teacher ratio average of 17.2. The average student body’s make up from
these incidents were American Indian/Alaska Native: 0.9%, Asian or Asian/Pacific Island: 3.3%,
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Hispanic: 19.8%, Black: 34.4%, White: 38%, Hawaiian National/Pacific Island: 0.2%, and two or
more races: 1.7%. The students were 50.4% male to 49.6% female. The attackers were primarily
male (94.0%). The majority of attackers were black or African American: 49.1%, followed by
white (not Hispanic or Latino): 33.5%, Hispanic or Latino: 9.2%, Middle Eastern: 3.5%, American
Indian or Alaskan native: 1.7%, Asian: 1.7%, and finally two or more races: 1.2%. The highest
offending age range was 16-20: 50%, followed by 21-25: 15.4%, 11-15: 14.9%, 31-35: 4.8%,
41-45: 4.3%, 26-30: 3.7%, 36-40: 3.2%, 51-55: 1.1%, 06-10: 0.5%, 46-50: 0.5%, 56-60: 0.5%,
61-65: 0.5%, and 66+: 0.5%. In total, there were 293 deaths and 467 injuries reported by these
incidents. Table 1.2 summarizes the statistics of the collected active shooter data.

1.3

Lessons Learned
In this section, we explore the initial data gathered. From this exploration, we are able to derive

important lessons to help with decision-making and identification. Note that the lessons are only
applicable for active shooter violence in an academic environment. We believe that such lessons
may help identify trends and attributes that can help hedge against the possible active shooter
threats in an academic environment.
Lesson 1: States with more registered weapons trend towards more active shooter incidents.
The results in Figures 1.1 and 1.2 support this observation. Figure 1.1 shows the state-wide
active shooter violence that occurred in an academic environment between 1999 to 2019. It is
observed that California has the highest number of recorded active shooter incidents (29 incidents)
during the reported period, followed by Florida (19), Georgia (18), Tennessee (13), and Texas (13).
The top reported violence states also have a larger number of registered weapons based on the report
7

Table 1.2
Summary of data statistics
Category
Total samples

Item
Total number of samples taken
School Classification Type

Event/Location

Full Time Equivalent (FTE)
Pupil to Teacher Ratio
Student Population Ethnicity (Average)

Student Population Gender (Average)

Age(years)
Attacker

Casualties
Weapon Type Used

8

Description
267
Primary school: 5.7%
Middle school: 11.5%
High school: 51.5%
Community college: 6.1%
University: 25.2%
Mean: 67.7
Median: 64.0
Mean: 17.9
Median: 17.2
American Indian/Alaska Native: 0.9%
Asian or Asian/Pacific Isl.:3.3%
Hispanic Students:19.8%
Black 34.4%
White:38.0%
Hawaiian Nat./Pacific Isl.:0.2%
Two or more races:1.7%
Male: 50.4%
Female: 49.6%
06-10: 0.5%
06-10: 0.5%
11-15: 14.9%
16-20: 50.0%
21-25: 15.4%
26-30: 3.7%
31-35: 4.8%
36-40: 3.2%
41-45: 4.3%
51-55: 1.1%
56-60: 0.5%
61-65: 0.5%
66+: 0.5%
Deaths: 293 (1.1 per event)
Injury: 467 (1.8 per event)
Pistol: 69.3%
Rifle: 10.7%
Shotgun: 7.1%
Multiple types 12.9%

Figure 1.1
Statewise Active Shooter Violence in an Academic Environment from 1999-2019

published by the Department of Justice (see Figure 1.2) [120]. Based on the data provided in Figure
1.2, Texas had the highest number of recorded firearms in 2019 (11.9% of the overall registered
firearms), while California (6.2%), Florida (7.1%), Georgia (3.7%), and Tennessee (2%) had a
significant contribution to that record. A few past studies attempted to support this claim (e.g.,[82],
[32]). For instance, Lankford [82] studied 171 counties in the United States and concluded that a
large number of registered firearms is the primary reason behind the higher percentage (31% over
total worldwide incidents) of the mass shooting incidents that occurred in the United States. Thus,
the author proposed that reducing firearm availability would be the most obvious step to drop the
public shooting violence. Along the same line, Chapman [32] identified that the number of active
shooter violence dropped significantly after the new gun control laws adopted by the Australian
government in 2007. Note that both the studies were conducted under certain limitations (e.g.,
only reported the resolved cases while a number of cases were still pending during the reporting
period, limited geographical area), and the conclusions remain questionable.
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Figure 1.2
Statewise Number of Registered Weapons in 2019

Lesson 2: Active Shooting trends have been increasing over the last few years.
This observation is supported by Figure 1.3, where it can be observed that the active shooter
violence in an academic environment increased significantly in the United States in recent years,
especially after 2013. The average number of violence prior to 2013 was recorded as 6 to 7,
while the average rose significantly to 24 to 25 after 2013. Based on our collected data, 2018
had the highest number of active shooter violence in an academic environment. In an effort to
explain this rise, we looked at the national divorce/marriage rates, national bullying rates, and the
national unemployment rate. Note that a number of prior studies attempted to see the correlation
between these factors and active shooter violence (e.g., unemployment rate [116], bullying and
harassment [67], and divorce rate [144]). Interestingly, despite all these factors declining in recent
years (see Figure 1.3), active shooter violence in an academic environment increased significantly.
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It is important to note that even though the bullying rate dropped in recent years, the percentage is
still at an alarming level ( 20%).

Figure 1.3
Active Shooter Violence and Trends in the United States on an Academic Enviornment by the
Year 1999 to 2019

Lesson 3: The most active months for active shooter violence are January and February, while
incident tapering off in November and December.
Figure 1.4 showcases the number of incidents that transpired for each month. From Figure
1.4, it can be observed that January and February are the most active months, while no active
shooter incidents are reported in July and a few in June. Further, the data reveals that the number
of incidents trends down as the end of the year approaches. Looking closely at the data reveals
further that there is a seasonal or monthly trend of active shooter violence. Figure 1.5 shows
the geographic distribution of active shooter violence by months. From the figure, it can be
11

observed that January and February are the most active months, where more than half of the
states had active shooter incidents. However, from April through June, the active shooter violence
started to decline in many states, while no violence is reported in July. During the month of
June over 1999-2019, only Washington, Oregon, California, and Massachusetts had active shooter
violence in an academic environment. During August, the active shooter incidents were primarily
concentrated around the Southeastern region of the United States. During the months of September
and October, the active shooter violence started to increase and distributed among other states of
the country. Finally, the violence started to decline during November and December. Note that
a few past studies attempted to correlate seasonal patterns with mental health. In [2], the authors
observed that all mental illnesses (e.g., ADHD (attention deficit-hyperactivity disorder), anxiety,
bipolar, depression, anorexia or bulimia, OCD (obsessive-compulsive disorder), schizophrenia, and
suicide) followed a trend of winter peaks and lowers in summer. Similar observations could also
be found for the case of divorce [23]. Though the results were conducted under limited resources
or geographic regions, it might be interesting to research this further to see the seasonal correlation
with active shooter violence
Lesson 4: The pistol is the most commonly used weapon for active shooter violence in the academic
environment.
Figure 1.6 shows the weapon used for active shooter violence in an academic environment
between 1999 and 2019. The figure shows that pistols were predominantly (69%) used for most
of the past active shooter violence, followed by rifles (11%) and shotguns (7%). In 13% of the
incidents, the attacker used multiple weapon types. The findings are consistent with other active
12

Figure 1.4
Active shooter incidents by month (1999-2019)

Figure 1.5
Geographic distribution of active shooter violence by month
13

shooter violence occurring outside an academic environment. For instance, the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI) reported that 56% of the attackers used pistols, 27% rifles, 14% shotguns,
and 3% unidentified in all active shooter violence that occurred between 2000 to 2015 outside an
academic environment.

Figure 1.6
Weapon usage by type in active shooter violence on an academic environment
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Lesson 5: People who identify as Black or African American are responsible for the highest number
of active shooter incidents (49%). However, people who identify as White alone cause the largest
number of deaths and injuries. Yet, it is the Asian alone category that causes the most deaths per
incident.
This observation is supported by Figures 1.7,1.8,1.9, 1.10. From Figure 1.7, it is observed that
Black or African Americans cause 49% of the active shooter incidents in an academic environment,
followed by White alone (not Hispanic or Latino) (34%), Hispanic or Latino (9%), and a small
contribution from other ethnics (e.g., Middle Eastern (3%), Asian (2%), American Indian and
Alaska Native (2%), and two or more races (1%)). Figure 1.8 shows that though White alone was
responsible for 34% of the active shooter incidents, such violence caused the highest percentage
of deaths (53%) and injuries (54%). On the contrary, Black or African Americans caused 17%
of deaths and 31% of injuries among all the active shooter violence taking place in an academic
environment despite causing a relatively higher percentage of overall violence (49%). Surprisingly,
the Asian ethnicity accounts for only 2% of the overall active shooter violence but caused nearly
17% of the overall death. Figure1.10 visualizes the casualties (deaths and injuries) per incident
that each ethnicity is responsible for. It can be observed that Asians alone caused 13.7 deaths per
incident, i.e., each incident caused on average 13.7 deaths, which is significantly higher compared
to other ethnicity types. American Indians and Alaska Natives were next to this list, with an average
of 4.0 deaths per incident, followed by White alone (2.3), Middle Eastern (1.8), two or more races
(1.5), Black or African American (0.5), and Hispanic or Latino (0.5).
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Figure 1.7
Percentage of active shooter incidents in an academic environment by ethnicity

Figure 1.8
Death by ethnicity
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Figure 1.9
Injuries by ethnicity

Figure 1.10
Casualties (deaths and injuries) per incident by ethnicity
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Lesson 6: The age range with the most active shooters is 16-20 year olds, with the majority of the
incidents being at high schools.
This observation is supported by Figure 1.11, where it can be seen that the age group 16-20
is responsible for almost 50% of the overall active shooter violence. The next two age groups are
11-15 years and 21-25 years, where both contribute 15% each of the overall active shooter violence.
The remaining age groups have a fairly less contribution (5% or less) to the overall violence. We
further break down the incidents based on the academic institutions (see Figure 1.12). From Figure
11, it can be observed that high schools are responsible for nearly 50% of the overall active shooter
violence, followed by universities ( 30%), middle schools ( 10%), community college ( 5%), and
primary schools ( 5%). The observation could provide insights to the law enforcement providers
on the age groups and schools which require additional attention.
Lesson 7: 26- 30 years of age cause the most injuries per incident and a very close second for
deaths per incident
This observation is supported by Figure 1.13, where it can be shown that the age group 26-30
years caused over 5 injuries and nearly 3 deaths per incident. The only other age group that created
more deaths than 26 - 30 years was the 46 -50 years age group (3 deaths per incident). Among
others, age group 21-25, 41-45, and 51-55 years caused over 2 deaths per incident for the recorded
active shooter violence in an academic environment between 1999 and 2019.
Lesson 8: About 1 in 5 AS incidents result in 3 or more killings
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Figure 1.11
Percentage of incidents by age range

Figure 1.12
Active shooter violence by school type
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Figure 1.13
Casualties (death and injuries) per incident vs. age of the shooter

The phrase “mass killing” was defined in a mandate by President Obama within the Investigative
Assistance for Violent Crimes Act of 2012. The mandate defined the phrase as 3 or more killings
during an incident, not including the death of the perpetrator. Figures 1.14 and 1.15 show the
active shooter mass killings (3 or more killings during an incident) by year and month that took
place in an academic environment between 1999 and 2019. In total, 53 mass killing incidents were
reported during this data collection period. Figure 1.14 reveals that the mass killing rate has been
alarmingly high in an academic environment in the last several years, especially after 2013. Figure
1.15 gives the monthly breakdown of the mass killings, where the peak months are identified as
February, April, and October (8 mass killing incidents). July is identified as the month when no
mass killing incident took place in an academic environment between 1999 and 2019.
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Figure 1.14
Active shooter mass killings by year (1999-2019)

Figure 1.15
Active shooter mass killings by month (1999-2019)
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1.4

Future Research Opportunities
Based on the lessons learned from Section 1.3, this section identifies three emergent areas that

need to be further researched in the context of active shooter violence occurring in an academic
environment: (i) location prediction for the violence; (ii) identifying root causes of increasing
the active shooter violence in an academic environment in recent years; and (iii) reevaluation of
human/crowd behavior and policies under active shooter violence. Below, we provide a detailed
discussion on these three emergent areas.

1.4.1

Location prediction for the active shooter violence:

Traditional methods of controlling and preventing active shooter violence focus on onsite security (e.g., mass notification systems, active [83, 60, 93, 57] ), training programs (e.g., improvised
explosive device awareness, breaching, school drills [105, 83, 161]), and identifying personal-level
risk factors for violence (e.g., feeling bullied, academic performance, a tendency towards violence
[40, 82, 18] ). There is a need for understanding what locations are at more risk of being involved
in active shooter incidents. Understanding which locations are at more risk for an incident taking
place allows resources to be allocated to help reduce the chance of an active shooter incident or
minimize causalities. Police have long used hot spot mapping to determine where arrests are commonly made to prevent crimes and to be present to reduce the fallout from crimes (e.g., [31, 19, 47]).
Hot spot mapping is a practice law enforcement uses to identify locations with a more statistical
probability of committing a particular crime. They do this by plotting arrests from crimes and
other known factors on detailed local maps. Much research has been done showing that police
presence alone is enough to reduce the occurrence of crimes (e.g.,[96]). Hot spot mapping works
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well for crimes that frequently occur in the same area, such as robberies [19]. It is less useful for
predicting infrequent crimes like active shooter events because the location of previous events only
determines hot spots. Active shooter violence is more spread out, and any attempt to map density
areas using hot spot mapping would be futile. Spatial factors (e.g., proximity to and density of
police stations, malls, foreclosures, gas stations, and nightclubs) can impact the seriousness and
frequency of crimes (e.g., [19, 44, 135, 8] ). In a recent study, Hecht [63] introduced Risk Terrain
Modeling (RTM). This technique identifies spatial risks that come from particular landscapes’
features and then models how those features collocate to create locations of risk. Nonresidential
location density and distance from police stations are the only two features used to develop the
model. Besides, criminologists and sociologists have long explored relationships between criminal
activity and the socio-economic variables that influence them (e.g., education [49], ethnicity [20],
income level [117], and unemployment level [50]). By exploring these relationships, we can create
a location profile to determine at-risk locations using statistical models and methods. Researchers
have begun to use machine learning (ML) to pursue a data-driven approach to identifying hot spot
areas. Classification algorithms are being used to help study and alert authorities to the possibility
of a crime at a specific location and time (e.g., Random Forests [17],[9, 145, 152] , K-means
[74, 136]], Naı̈ve Bayesian [58, 143, 12]and Back Propagation [58, 12, 149]. Other research has
employed Kernel Density Estimation (KDE) to identify where crime hotspots may occur [31, 47].
We could not find research that uses ML to help alert authorities to the possibility of time and
location of AS incidents. There is a great need to develop more sophisticated predictive algorithms
to identify locations of concern for possible active shooter violence.
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1.4.2

Identifying root causes of increasing the active shooter violence in an academic environment in recent years:

The overall violent crime rate (e.g., offenses of murder, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault.)
in the United States has declined over the last few decades, as can be observed in Figure 1.16 [112].
A cornucopia of research explains the decrease in general violent crime rates in past years (e.g.,
[138, 64, 114, 68, 89]). Many researchers have used statistical tools to understand the relationships
between different types of crimes and the associated features (e.g., median income [138], poverty
level [117], education level [56]). The regression analysis has been predominantly performed to
determine the relationship between the general crimes and their covariants [138]. Various machine
learning algorithms have also been employed to analyze the crime data (e.g., Decision stump (e.g.,
[56, 75]), blocked algorithm (e.g., [21]), Apriori (e.g., [148]), K-means (e.g., [148])).

Figure 1.16
United States general violent crime rate 1990-2019)
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On the other hand, Figure 1.3 shows that active shooter violence has continued to increase
since 1999. This is in contrast to the violent crime trend shown in Figure 1.16 over the same time
frame. There is very little research on identifying the causal relationships between population
demographics and active shooter incidents. There leads to a gap in the literature on understanding
the underlying factors that cause the alarming growth of active shooter violence in an academic
environment.

1.4.3

Reevaluation of human/crowd behavior and policies under active shooter violence:

The existing best practices (policies) offered by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) under
active shooter violence are RHF (Run, Hide, and Fight) and ALICE (Alert, Lockdown, Inform,
Counter, and Evacuate) protocol. However, it is difficult to determine if these practices have been
successful in a casualty rate reduction. Ledoux [85] studied that Run, Hide, and especially Fight
are not how humans behave during an urgent social disorder. Instead, in an active shooter violence
situation, humans tend to be inactive and freeze up despite any training that may be given. Figure
16 shows the number of people injured and killed by school type from 1999 to 2019, where it can
be observed that majority of the people killed or injured in active shooter violence in their high
schools. Therefore, it is imperative for the safety of civilians that we gain a thorough understanding
of human behavior under these extreme crises conditions.
Understanding human behavior has proved challenging due to the complex and enigmatic
interactions among multiple factors, which are incredibly challenging to correlate. These factors include social attributes (e.g., herding and leader following behavior [95, 132]), emergency
attributes (e.g., firearms, explosions, and natural disasters ), and building attributes (e.g., the
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Figure 1.17
Number of people killed and injured by school type 1999-2019)

placement and visibility of signage, stairs, and exits [95]). Recently these complex interactions
have been partitioned broadly into several classes: human-human interactions, human-building
interactions, human-emergency interactions, and the second-order interactions amongst humans,
buildings, and emergencies [158]. Human-human interactions are interactions among people or
groups of people and how their behavior is influenced by each other. Human-building interactions look at how the building affects human behavior. Human-emergency interactions are how
emergency crises impact human behavior and the coping mechanisms humans have during these
crises. Human-human interactions are of significant importance to understand due to the need to
grant decision-makers the ability to remove barriers that are causing the egress of the building to
be impeded. Herding, grouping, avoiding, leader-following, helping and competing, and information sharing are crucial determining factors of human behaviors during emergencies in buildings
(e.g., [95, 132, 37]). Similarly, building attributes such as alarms (e.g., [120, 11]), corridors (e.g.,
[38, 129]), exits (e.g.,[115, 16]), signage (e.g., [146, 53]), and stairs/elevators (e.g., [118, 119, 65])
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have all been studied under different emergency situations, such as fire (e.g., [29, 151]), earthquake
(e.g., [130, 98, 13]), and odious violent acts (e.g., mass killings and terrorist attacks [100, 90, 92]).
The behaviors that ensue from the interactions are pivotal to better understanding what can
be done to minimize casualties from an incident. Researchers have developed numerous models
and theories to help explain these behaviors that center mostly around buildings, such as preevacuation behavior (e.g., pre-event and information seeking [99, 81, 76]), way finding behavior
(e.g., [42, 142, 140, 103, 33, 54, 155, 153, 27]), interaction behavior with others (e.g., grouping,
competing, helping, queuing, waiting [134, 45] ), and interaction behaviors with the environment
(e.g., hazard-fighting behavior, property-protecting, and risk-taking behavior [65, 98, 25] ). Further,
different social, psychological, and behavioral theories have been developed that attempt to explain
human behavior under such emergent situations (e.g., panic theory [123], heightened emotional
theory [70], social attachment/affiliative theory [108], self-categorized/social identity theory [69],
role rule theory [26], organizational breakdown theory [72], social proof theory [39], and social
influence theory [111]).
Most of the above methods primarily used fire evacuation as a primary application area to
validate the theories. However, active shooter violence carries several unique characteristics that
make the incident different from the other extreme events, such as the presence of weapons, intent
of the shooter to cause harm, shorter durations (typically finishes in less than 5 minutes), and many
more [74]. Thus, the question remains whether the knowledge gained from the existing behavioral
theories and research methods could still be utilized to explain an active shooter violence situation.
Currently, there is a lack of innovative yet realistic research methods available for testing an active
shooter violence scenario. Consequently, no theoretical developments are available in the literature
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to date, which could explain human evacuation route choice decisions during an active shooter
incident. Most existing studies have investigated the effects of different key active shooter violence
parameters (e.g., discharge rate or magazine capacity) by developing a simulation model [62, 88].
However, the models may not entirely capture individuals’ response behaviors or made very simple
behavioral assumptions that may not accurately represent the reality (e.g., move/do not move for all
civilians in a given simulation trial). Lastly, research is needed to develop advanced quantitative
methods, such as machine learning techniques or optimization models, to effectively and efficiently
evaluate the civilian response behavior under different active shooter violence scenarios.

1.5

Conclusions
This study collected active shooter violence data taken place in an academic environment

between 1999 to 2019. We then generated a number of lessons (Lessons 1 to 8) by dissecting
the dataset. The lessons provide insights about vulnerable age groups (e.g., most active shooters
between 16-20 years old and 26-30 years age group cause the most injuries per incident), ethnicities
(e.g., Black or African American for the highest number of active shooter incidents; White alone for
the largest number of deaths and injuries; and Asian alone for the most deaths per incident), trends
(e.g., increasing recent violence trends and mass killings), school environment (e.g., highest active
shooter incidents at high schools), critical months (e.g., January and February), and locations with
correlation with other factors (e.g., weapons). We then identified a few possible pressing areas that
require imminent attention by the research communities, such as location prediction, identifying
the root causes of increasing the violence, and reevaluating the human/crowd behavior and policies
under an active shooter violence situation. We believe the insights given in this study could help
28

researchers, stakeholders, and policymakers developing new tools/policies to possibly alleviate
the casualties resulted from active shooter violence occurring in an academic environment. Even
though this study introduced a number of lessons that are observed from the collected data, the
insights can only be applicable to an academic environment due to the scope of collecting the data.
Future research could be dedicated to broadening the scope from an academic environment to other
public places and examine the correlation between the two environments
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CHAPTER II
AN OPTIMIZATION MODELING FRAMEWORK TO EVALUATE CIVILIANS RESPONSE
UNDER ACTIVE SHOOTER VIOLENCE SITUATIONS

2.1

Introduction
The US Department of Homeland Security defines Active Shooter (AS)violence as “An indi-

vidual actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a confined and populated area; in
most cases, active shooters use firearm(s), and there is no pattern or method to their selection of
victim” [1]. Even with significant improvements in developing different training modules or violence mitigation technologies, the frequency of active shooter violence and the resultant casualty
rate have increased significantly over the last decades. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
reported 277 active shooter violence between 2000 and 2018, resulting in 884 and 1,546 people
killed and wounded, respectively. The FBI further reported that the active shooter violence escalated to 21.2 incidents/year between 2011 and 2018 compared to 8.6 incidents/year between 2000
and 2010. The United States witnessed the highest active shooter violence (417 occurrences) in a
given calendar year in 2019. Even more alarming than the frequency of incidents is the increase in
the number of casualties resulting from active shooter violence. In 2000-2010, the average number
of casualties was recorded just over 60 per year, which increased to 196 per year between 2011 and
2018. Further, a large portion of the violence occurred in public places, where the civilians are
not allowed to carry firearms (e.g., businesses and shopping malls (43.7%), Pre-K to 12 schools
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(14.8%), universities (6%), health care facilities (4.3%), churches (4%), and others (0.4%)). With
such an increase in active shooter violence, especially in an academic environment, it becomes
imperative to learn from the past violence and identify the pressing areas that require immediate
attention by the research communities. One of the areas that require immediate attention is the
reevaluation of human/crowd behavior and policies under active shooter violence.

2.1.1

Objectives

This study aims to extend previous work done in the development of advanced quantitative
methods and modeling of active shooter scenarios. The first extension will be which multiclass classification algorithms provide the best predictions for civilian movement within an AS
environment. The next extension is to model human/crowd behavior with herding and determine
how it affects the amount of people that exit the system or find a safe hiding place given limited
hiding capacity. This improves upon the optimization models to improve the effectiveness and
efficiency of evaluating the civilian response under different active shooter scenarios.

2.1.2

Literature Review

The existing best practices (policies) offered by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) under
active shooter violence are RHF (Run, Hide, and Fight) and ALICE (Alert, Lockdown, Inform,
Counter, and Evacuate) protocol. However, it is difficult to determine if these practices have been
successful in a casualty rate reduction. Ledoux studied that Run, Hide, and especially Fight are
not how humans behave during an urgent social disorder [84]. Instead, in an active shooter violence situation, humans tend to be inactive and freeze up despite any training that may be given.
Understanding human behavior has proved challenging due to the complex and enigmatic interac31

tions among multiple factors, which are incredibly challenging to correlate. These factors include
social attributes (e.g., herding and leader following behavior ([94] [133]), emergency attributes
(e.g., firearms, explosions, and natural disasters [79]), and building attributes (e.g., the placement
and visibility of signage, stairs, and exits [94]). Recently these complex interactions have been
partitioned broadly into several classes: human-human interactions, human-building interactions,
human-emergency interactions, and the second-order interactions among humans, buildings, and
emergencies [159]. Human-human interactions are interactions among people or groups of people
and how their behavior is influenced by each other. Human-building interactions look at how the
building affects human behavior. Human-emergency interactions are how emergency crises affects
human behavior and the coping mechanisms humans have during these crises. Human-human
interactions are of significant importance to understand due to the need to grant decision-makers
the ability to remove barriers that are causing the egress of the building to be impeded. Herding,
grouping, avoiding, leader following, helping and competing, and information sharing are crucial
determining factors of human behaviors during emergencies in buildings (([94] and [133], [35]).
Similarly, building attributes such as alarms ( [51], [10], corridors ([79], [36]), Shahhoseini and
Sarvi 2019), exits ([139],[15] ), signage ([147]), and stairs/elevators ([125],[48],[66]) have all been
studied under different emergency situations, such as fire ([79],[30],[150]), earthquake ([131],
[97],[14]), and odious violent acts (e.g., mass killings and terrorist attacks ([121], [91]). The
behaviors that ensue from the above mentioned interactions are pivotal to better understanding
what can be done to minimize casualties from an incident. Researchers have developed numerous
models and theories to help explain these behaviors that center mostly around buildings, such
as pre-evacuation behavior (e.g., pre-event and information seeking ([104]), way finding behavior
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([43],[141],[124],[34],[55],[156],[154],[28]) interaction behavior with others (e.g., grouping, competing, helping, queuing, waiting ([6],[52],[110],[46]), and interaction behaviors with the environment (e.g., hazard-fighting behavior, property-protecting, and risk-taking behavior ([66],[97],[24]).
Further, different social, psychological, and behavioral theories have been developed that attempt
to explain human behavior under such emergent situations (e.g., panic theory([122]), heightened
emotional theory ([69]), social attachment/affiliative theory([3]), self-categorized/social identity
theory([59]), role rule theory ([41]), organizational breakdown theory ([71]), social proof theory,
and social influence theory. Most of the above methods primarily used fire evacuation as a primary
application area to validate the theories. However, active shooter violence carries several unique
characteristics that make the incident different from the other extreme events, such as the presence
of weapons, and intent of the shooter to cause harm, shorter duration (typically finishes in less than
5 minutes). Thus, the question remains whether the knowledge gained from the existing behavioral
theories and research methods could still be utilized to explain an active shooter violence situation.
Currently, there is a lack of innovative yet realistic research methods available for testing an active
shooter violence scenario. Consequently, no theoretical developments are available in the literature
to date, which could explain human evacuation route choice decisions during an active shooter
incident. Most existing studies have investigated the effects of different key active shooter violence
parameters (e.g., discharge rate or magazine capacity) by developing a simulation model([61],[86]).
However, the models may not entirely capture individual response behaviors or made very simple
behavioral assumptions that may not accurately represent the reality (e.g., move/do not move for
all civilians in a given simulation trial). It is important to note that one study, ([106]), uses a mathematical model formula that specifically optimizes individual behavioral decisions. These factors
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accounted for are the capacity of the facility and individual choices, heterogeneity of individual
behavioral and choice sets, restriction on choice sets depending on the location of the shooter and
facility orientation. The time space movement is captured for the attacker as well as the civilians
by utilizing a greedy heuristic algorithm that solves the model under a rolling horizon framework.
This is the work that we are extending.

2.2 Problem Description and Model Formulation
2.2.1 Decision-Making Framework
We begin this section by outlining the framework used to assess the safety and security of an
academic building (see Figure 2.1). First, an academic building is chosen for a test site. We then
collect survey data from the participants (see Section 2.3.1 for details) associated with the building
(e.g., students). The survey captures the choices of the participants (run, hide, or fight) under
different active shooter violence situations. The participants’ behavioral data are then used to train
several machine learning models in an effort to predict future movement choices. After choosing
the top-performing machine learning algorithm (based on accuracy, F-score, or other performance
metrics), we build a utility-driven optimization model (introduced in Section 2.2.4) to determine
the civilians’ recovery under different active shooter violence situations. The overall recovery of the
civilians/agents under a specified building configuration is examined under different performance
indicators as outlined in Section 2.2.5.

2.2.2

Facility Layout

The facility, denoted by set G, is a two-story academic building that does not allow guns or other
weapons. Figure 2.2 illustrates an example of an academic test building. It is assumed that the
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Figure 2.1
Decision-making framework for assessing civilians response under an active shooter violence
situation

facility is partitioned into equal-sized grids (𝑔 × 𝑔). The two-storied building is assumed to be
connected with two separate stairways. We split set G into two major types: (𝑖) blocked grids
and (𝑖𝑖) unblocked grids. Blocked grids, denoted by set G 𝑏 ⊂ G, represent the set of grids where
either a agent is not present, or the shooter cannot travel (e.g., locked storage room). Conversely,
unblocked grids, denoted by set G 𝑢 = G \G 𝑏 , represent the set of grids where both shooter and
agents are permitted to travel. Furthermore, let us have a set of grids, G 𝑎 ⊂ G 𝑢 , where an attack
may potentially occur. The unblocked grids are partitioned into five major types: laboratory cells,
public place cells, corridor cells, stairways cells, and exit/entrance cells. The laboratory cells,
denoted by set G ℎ ⊂ G 𝑢 , can be considered as hiding places for the agents in the case of an active
shooter violence situation. These cells are locked and may accommodate a maximum of 𝑣 𝑔ℎ agents.
Upon reaching the capacity 𝑣 𝑔ℎ , no agents are allowed to enter these cells. For instance, the second
floor of our test building has two laboratory cells that can be locked (see Figure 2.2). Public space
cells are areas within the building where both the agents and the attackers may potentially interact.
These cells have no locking or hiding capabilities (see Figure 2.2). Unlike the laboratory cells, no
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capacity is imposed to those cells. An example of a public space cell in an academic building would
be a classroom or a study room. Corridor cells, denoted by set G 𝑐 , and stairway cells, denoted by
set G 𝑠 , are both used to allow movement throughout the building (see Figure 2.2). Even though
no capacity restrictions are imposed on the corridor, stairways are restricted with a capacity of 𝑣 𝑔𝑠 ,
which will allow only a certain number of agents to use them in a given time. No restrictions are
imposed on the direction of flows within the stairways. The last type of cells is the exit/entrance
cells, which are denoted by set G 𝑒 ⊂ G 𝑢 . For instance, the first floor of the test building has three
entrances/exits. The attacker may potentially enter the facility via one of these entrances. At the
same time, the agents will attempt to evacuate via one of these exits. No restriction is imposed on
how many people can exit at a time.

Figure 2.2
Illustration of the test building
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2.2.3

Movement

As we approached based on an agent-based model, two types of agents are considered, namely,
attackers and agents. It is assumed that the attacker(s) will enter the facility via one of the building
entrances and reach a predefined attack grid. The second type of agent is the civilians, which we
denoted by set N and indexed by 𝑛. At any time, each agent 𝑛 ∈ N is capable of choosing an
action on how to move and react under a certain violent situation. We represent these directional
choices (actions) by set I and are indexed by 𝑖. During the course of this study, we are evaluating
the run and hide option of the RHF program. The directional choices for the agent are runUp,
runDown, runLeft, runRight, or stay, which is visualized in Figure 2.3. Neither the agent nor
the attacker is allowed diagonal movement between the cells. It is assumed that the agents do not
have any prior knowledge about the attack. As such, each agent is subjected to a cognitive delay
which we denoted by {𝜋𝑛 }𝑛∈N . The cognitive delay captures how quickly a agent can recover from
the initial shock and respond to a situation. The standard travel time for an agent to run from grid
𝑔 ∈ G 𝑢 to 𝑔′ ∈ G 𝑔 is denoted by 𝑡˜𝑔𝑔′ . Notice that we assume that all agents would require equal
time to move from one grid to its neighboring grid.

Figure 2.3
Possible movement allowed to an agent
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Like actions undertaken by agents, a building’s physical attributes also play a vital role in the
ultimate recovery/casualty rate resulting from active shooter violence. For instance, if a public
space is a classroom, there may only be the option to stay or move out of the classroom into a
corridor. The agent cannot choose to move from one classroom into another because there may
not be a door to egress. Each cell 𝑔 ∈ G 𝑢 has neighboring cells, denoted by set G𝑔,𝑖 , that the
agent can travel to, given a choice 𝑖 ∈ I made by the agent. Figure 2.4 visualizes the available
choices/actions permitted for a agent within each cell 𝑔 ∈ G 𝑢 in the test building.

Figure 2.4
Possible movement allowed to an agent within each cell of the test building

2.2.4

Model Formulation

Given the facility layout and agent’s permittable movements provided in subsection 2.2.2 and
2.2.3, this subsection introduces a mathematical model which aims to maximize the civilians’
utility under an active shooter violence situation. First, the individual civilian/agent utility at a
given time period is determined using a machine learning approach. Let 𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑟 to denote the utility
associated with choosing alternative 𝑖 ∈ I by agent 𝑛 ∈ N locating at grid 𝑔 ∈ G under scenario
𝑟 = 1, 2, ..., 𝑅. Different scenario 𝑟 imply a different possible trail of the experiment. For instance,
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in one trial, it can be assumed that the attacker would enter the facility in one of the building
entrances and would try to reach a specific grid. In contrast, another trial would imply a different
possible trajectory of the attacker and the like. Note that the utility, 𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑟 , could also be calculated
using a discrete choice model (see [106] for details). However, in this study, we employed different
machine learning classification algorithms, namely, AdaBoost, Gaussian Naive Bayes, Gradient
Boosting, 𝐾-Nearest Neighborhood (KNN), Logistic Regression, and Random Forrest, to estimate
the agent-specific utility function, 𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑟 .
After choosing the best performing algorithms we utilize it to obtain the utility of an alternative
𝑖 being chosen by a civilian 𝑛 in each grid 𝑔 for all time 𝑟 in 𝑅 given our attacker path. The civilian
will take the highest utility option unless that option has become unavailable. This can happen
if the capacity for the stairway has been reached or if the capacity for the hiding place has been
reached. If the capacity is reached for either of these types of cells then even though that direction
is typically an option to move to it will be unavailable for that time period. If the highest option
is now unavailable the civilian will take the next highest probability option. The objective of this
problem is to maximize the probability of the alternative 𝑖 chosen by civilian 𝑛 in grid 𝑔. We are
obtain this objective by introducing formula AS.

[AS]

𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒

1
𝑅

Í

𝑛∈N

Í

𝑔∈G 𝑈𝑛𝑔𝑟

subject to

𝑌𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑟 ≤ 𝑌𝑖𝑛𝑔

∀𝑖 ∈ I, 𝑛 ∈ N , 𝑔 ∈ G 𝑢 , 𝑟 = 1, 2, ..., 𝑅
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(2.1)

where 𝑌𝑖𝑛𝑔 is a binary variable used to denote the availability of alternative i to a civilian n
located in grid g and 𝑌𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑟 is the availability of alternative i to a civilian n located in grid g under
realization r. This constraint indicates that an alternative 𝑖 ∈ I is not available for this scenario
level r and is not a feasible option for the grid 𝑔 ∈ G 𝑢 by the civilian 𝑛 ∈ N .

∀𝑖 ∈ I, 𝑛 ∈ N𝑙 ∪ N𝑛 , 𝑔 ∈ G 𝑢 , 𝑟 = 1, 2, ..., 𝑅
(2.2)



if 𝑌𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑟 = 0
 0

is the adjusted probability of an alternative,𝑖 being selected by civilian 𝑛 in grid 𝑔

𝑋𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑟 =

where 𝑋𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑟





 𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑟 if 𝑌𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑟 = 1


under realization 𝑟 after considering alternatives available,𝑌𝑖𝑛𝑔 , in this grid,𝑔.

∀𝑖 ∈ I, 𝑛 ∈ N , 𝑔 ∈ G 𝑢 , 𝑟 = 1, 2, ..., 𝑅

𝑙 𝑛𝑔𝑟 ≤ 𝑋𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑟

∀𝑖 ∈ I, 𝑛 ∈ N , 𝑔 ∈ G 𝑢 , 𝑟 = 1, 2, ..., 𝑅

𝑋𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑟 ≤ 𝑙 𝑛𝑔𝑟 + 𝜙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑟 𝑌𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑟

(2.3)
(2.4)

𝑈𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑟 − 𝜙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑟 (1 − 𝑌𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑟 ) ≤ 𝑋𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑟

∀𝑖 ∈ I, 𝑛 ∈ N , 𝑔 ∈ G 𝑢 , 𝑟 = 1, 2, ..., 𝑅

(2.5)

𝑋𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑟 ≤ 𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑟

∀𝑖 ∈ I, 𝑛 ∈ N , 𝑔 ∈ G 𝑢 , 𝑟 = 1, 2, ..., 𝑅

(2.6)

𝑍𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑟 ≤ 𝑌𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑟

∀𝑖 ∈ I, 𝑛 ∈ N , 𝑔 ∈ G 𝑢 , 𝑟 = 1, 2, ..., 𝑅

(2.7)

∑︁ ∑︁
𝑔∈G 𝑢

𝑍𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑟 = 1

∀𝑛 ∈ N , 𝑟 = 1, 2, ..., 𝑅

𝑖∈I

(𝜋𝑛 + 𝑡 𝑛𝑔𝑔′ )𝑍𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑔′ 𝑟 ≤ 𝜁𝑔 𝑡˜𝑔𝑔′ ∀𝑛 ∈ N , 𝑔 ∈ G 𝑢 , 𝑖 ∈ I \ {𝑖5 }, 𝑔′ ∈ G𝑔,𝑖
𝑍𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑟 = 𝑍𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑔′ 𝑟
∑︁ ∑︁ ∑︁
𝑛∈N

(2.8)

∀𝑖 ∈ I, 𝑛 ∈ N , 𝑔 ∈ G 𝑢 , 𝑔′ ∈ G𝑔,𝑖

(2.9)
(2.10)

𝑍𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑔′ ≤ 𝑣 𝑔ℎ′

∀𝑔′ ∈ G ℎ , 𝑟 = 1, 2, ..., 𝑅

(2.11)

𝑍𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑔′ ≤ 𝑣 𝑔𝑠 ′

∀𝑔′ ∈ G 𝑠 , 𝑟 = 1, 2, ..., 𝑅

(2.12)

𝑖∈I𝑔′ 𝑔∈G𝑔′ ′ ,𝑖

∑︁ ∑︁ ∑︁
𝑛∈N 𝑖∈I𝑔′ 𝑔∈G𝑔′ ′ ,𝑖

𝑈𝑛𝑔𝑟 ≤ 𝑋𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑟 + 𝜙𝑛𝑔𝑟 (1 − 𝑍𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑟 )∀𝑖 ∈ I, 𝑛 ∈ N , 𝑔 ∈ G 𝑢
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(2.13)

In the AS-exposed environment when under high uncertainty and placed within stressful
situations, a person finds there way through the building by exhibiting many different behaviors.
One of these behaviors is labeled as a social factor is the herding phenomenon [102], which states
an individual tends to follow others during a building emergency. Herding can help people who do
not know the building as well evacuate[101] efficiently but when it comes to exit choice herding
may also cause an unbalanced use of exits [7]. To account for this, let N 𝑓 represents the follower
civilians, N𝑙 represents the leader civilians, and N𝑛 represents the neutral civilians. We know that
𝑁 = N 𝑓 ∪ N𝑙 ∪ N𝑛 . We then will utilize the discounted utility concept for neutral and leader
civilians to obtain:





 𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑟 if 𝑌𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑟 = 1


∀𝑖 ∈ I, 𝑛 ∈ N𝑙 ∪ N𝑛 , 𝑔 ∈ G 𝑢 , 𝑟 = 1, 2, ..., 𝑅



 l𝑛𝑔𝑟 if 𝑌𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑟 = 0

Lastly if we Utilize the discounted utility concept for follower civilians we obtain:
𝑋𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑟 =

𝑋𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑟 =





{𝑢𝑖𝑛′ 𝑔𝑟 } if 𝑌𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑟 = 1

 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚

𝑛′ ∈N𝑙𝑔



{l𝑛′ 𝑔𝑟 }

 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚
′
 𝑛 ∈N𝑙𝑔

∀𝑖 ∈ I, 𝑛 ∈ N 𝑓 , 𝑔 ∈ G 𝑢 , 𝑟 = 1, 2, ..., 𝑅

(2.14)

(2.15)

if 𝑌𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑟 = 0

where N𝑙𝑔 ⊂ N𝑙 represent the subset of leader individuals in grid 𝑔 ∈ G 𝑢 .
2.2.5

Key Performance Indicators

Model [AS] is solved in a rolling-horizon framework, where at each time period model [AS] is
solved and the current position and action of the agents (civilians and attacker) are recorded and fed
as an input to the next period. In addition, at the end of each time period, model [AS] is assessed
based on three key performance indicators. The first is the number of agents that have exited the
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system via the exit cells, G 𝑒 , denoted by parameter 𝑉𝐸 . The second key performance indicator
is the number of agents that are able to hide in the system, denoted by parameter 𝑉𝐻 . Lastly, the
number of agents that are still at risk, denoted by parameter 𝑉𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾 . Essentially, these are the agents
who could not hide or exit the building.
2.3

Experimental Results

This section presents the lessons learned from solving model [AS]. The optimization model is
coded in Python 3.7 on a desktop computer with Intel Core i5 2.5 GHz processor and 32.0 GB
RAM. A state-of-the-art commercial solver, Gurobi Optimizer (version 6.52), is used to solve the
optimization model.
2.3.1

Input Parameters

All the input parameters for model [AS] are obtained from one of our prior studies [106]. In [106],
we surveyed 176 university students (31.4% female) who were already familiar with the academic
building. Among the participants, 98.9% of the students fall within the 16 to 30 age group, while
the remaining portion falls in 31 to 45. The majority of the participants were Caucasian (80.6%;
29.1% among them were female), followed by African-American: 8.6% (53.3% female), Asian:
6.9 (50% female), Latino Hispanic: 2.9% (no female), and others (e.g., Native American and Native
Hawaiian/Pacific Islander): 1.0% (no female). Among The participants, 5.1% had a physical or
mental impairment (22.2% among them were female); 22.3% had prior online active shooter
training experiences (28.2% among them were female), and 10.9% never played any shootingrelated video games (78.9% among them were female). Finally, 72% of the participants reported
that they would be able to make a decision (e.g., runUp, runDown, runLeft, runRight, or stay)
between 2 to 6 seconds under an extremely stressful situation. A summary of the participants is
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provided in Table 2.1. During surveys, all the students were asked questions about the type of
grid-specific decision they would undertake under different active shooter violence situations. The
proximity to the shooter, hiding places, and exits was recorded under each of these scenarios.
Table 2.1
Summary of the survey results (obtained from [106])
Item
Total samples
Ethnicity

Total disability
Prior online training experience
Gaming experience

Decision-making capability (under stress)

2.3.2

Description
176 (31.4% female)
Caucasian: 80.6% (29.1% female)
African-American: 8.6% (53.3% female)
Asian: 6.9% (50.0% female)
Latino-Hispanic: 2.9% (No female)
Others: 1.0% (No female)
5.1% (22.2% female)
Yes: 22.3% (28.2.2% female)
No: 77.7% (32.4% female)
None: 10.9% (78.9% female)
Basic: 17.1% (66.7% female)
Average: 20.6% (25.0% female)
Above Average: 23.4% (22.0% female)
Expert: 28.0% (4.1% female)
Very slow (≤ 8 seconds): 2.3% (25.0% female)
Slow (6-8 seconds): 3.4% (33.3% female)
Average (4-6 seconds): 30.3% (45.3% female)
Quick (2-4 seconds): 41.7% (32.9% female)
Very quick (≤ 2 seconds): 22.3% (10.3% female)

Experimenting with Machine Learning Algorithms to obtain 𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑟

Based on the feedback obtained from the survey participants, we test different machine learning
algorithms to estimate 𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑟 . The results are shown in Table 2.2.
We can see that for the accuracy test the two best performers were Logistic Regression and
Random Forest. If we evaluate based on the F score then the two best performances are from
Random Forest and KNN. From these results, we will take the two best from each category of
performance evaluation to test our optimization models. This means we will take logistic regression,
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Table 2.2
Performance measures of different machine learning algorithms
Algorithm
AdaBoost
GaussianNB
Gradient Boosting
KNN
Logistic Regression
Random Forest

Avg. Accuracy
(%)
61.1
66.9
66.9
68.7
70.6
70.4

Avg. F-Score
(%)
59.6
60.5
62.9
63.2
62.7
63.4

random forest and KNN. Figure 2.5 shows values of F scores over the different iterations.Figure
2.6 shows values of accuracy over the different iterations ran for the data set.

Figure 2.5
F-score (%) of the machine learning algorithms

2.3.3

Lessons Learned

In this subsection, we first present the base case results to illustrate the model applications.
Following this, we vary a set of key input parameters, such as the hiding place capacities, cognitive
delay of an agents, initial distribution in our test facility, and whether herding behavior is allowed
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Figure 2.6
Accuracy (%) of of the machine learning algorithms

or not, to derive important lessons for the decision-makers. We believe such lessons may help the
decision-makers to design a safe and reliable facility that can potentially hedge against possible
active shooter threats. Table 2.3 introduces the key input parameters used in the base case
experimentation.
Figure 2.7 shows the values of performance measures, 𝑉𝐸 , 𝑉𝐻 , and 𝑉𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾 , over time period 𝑡
= {0, 15, 30, 45, 60, 75,90,105,120,135,150,165} seconds and under the base input parameters as
discussed in Table 2.3. It can be observed that under the base case parameters, 𝑉𝐻 and 𝑉𝐸 change to
{0.0, 1.1, 6.3, 12, 16.6, 17.2, 17.2, 17.2, 17.2, 17.2, 17.2, 17.2}% and {0.0, 1.1, 4.0, 8.0, 10.3, 13.2,
13.7, 13.7, 14.3,14.3,14.3,14.3}%, respectively, from the onset till 165 seconds of the violence,
resulting in a total number of agents still at risk of 𝑉𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾 = {100.0, 89.7, 87.4, 80.0,73.2,69.7, 69.2,
69.2, 68.6, 68.6, 68.0, 68.0}%. Notice that 𝑉𝐻 did not change after 75 seconds (17.2%) due to the
limited hiding capacity. Most importantly, 𝑉𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾 was still at 68%, meaning that 68% of the agents
were still at risk of potential active shooter violence given the infrastructure, sample population,
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Table 2.3
Base input parameters
Parameter
Number of agents
Machine Learning algorithm
Standard average travel time, 𝑡˜𝑔𝑔′
Hidden grid capacity
Decision making capability
(Percentage of agents)

Cell distribution
(Percentage of agents)
Floor distribution
(Percentage of agents)
Herding distribution
(Percentage of agents)

Value
176
Random Forest
15 seconds
30 agents
Very slow: 2.0%
Slow: 4.0%
Average: 30.0%
Quick: 42.0%
Very quick: 22.0%
Corridor: 30.0%
Public Place: 70.0%
Second Floor: 30.0%
First Floor: 70.0%
Leaders: 100.0%
Followers: 0.0%

and base parameters reported in Figure 2.4 and Tables 2.1 and 2.3. Below, we vary different base
parameters from Table 2.3 and derive several important insights.

Figure 2.7
Base case results of 𝑉𝐻 , 𝑉𝐸 , and 𝑉𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾 over time
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Lesson 1: Building configurations (e.g. location and number of both stairways and hiding places)
plays a significant role in the number of civilians at risk under an AS violence incident
During this set of trials we varied the stair configuraiton in our model. Refer to figures
2.8,2.9,2.10. The results are shown in figure 2.11. During this experiment we also vary the
distribution of the civilians in the upstairs and downstairs. The three distributions are 100% on the
2nd floor, 75% on the second floor, and 50% on the 2nd floor. These distributions are conducted
for all three stair case configurations giving us a total of 9 experiments. It can be seen in figure
2.11 that the variance between the experiments conducted is 7.4%. This is a significant difference
in the at risk civilians given different stair case distributions.

Figure 2.8
Illustration of test building with both stairs

In another experiment that supports lesson 1,we varied the amount civilians that could hide in
the facility.The two hiding places on the 2nd floor were allowed to have combined capacities of
0,10,20,30,40,50,60,70, and 180. The rest of the parameters were kept at a base case and base
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Figure 2.9
Illustration of test building missing left stairs

Figure 2.10
Illustration of test building missing right stairs
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Figure 2.11
Stair experiment results of 𝑉𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾 vs. time

configuration for these experiments. We can see from figure 2.12 that the variance at the end of the
experiment time is 40.9%. This is a significant impact to the amount of people that are at risk and
should be considered. Figure 2.13 shows a similar trend in the variance in people direclty hiding.
The variance of hiding capacity has very little impact on the number of people exiting the facility
as shown in figure 2.14.
Lesson 2: Herding behavior plays a significant role in the safety of civilians under an AS incident

The results in figures 2.15,2.16,and 2.17 support this observation. Note that for with herding
experiments 20% of the civilians are randomly selected as leaders. The herding behavior causes
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Figure 2.12
Capacity experiment results of 𝑉𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾 vs. time

Figure 2.13
Capacity experiment results of 𝑉𝐻 vs. time
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Figure 2.14
Capacity experiment results of 𝑉𝐸 vs. time

an increase in the at risk civilians of a system. The increase is about 6%. This makes the behavior
a significant attribute that must be considered in a simulation.
Lesson 3: Cognitive delay can significantly extend the risk-exposure time for the civilians under
an AS incident
This finding is not a new finding but a reaffirmation of previous findings found in MM.The
results in figures 2.18,2.19, and 2.20 support this observation. The graphs present the impact of
𝑉𝐻 ,𝑉𝐸 and 𝑉𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾 under different decision making capabilities of the civilians. We consider five
different decision making capabilities of the civilians, namely, base, very slow, slow, quick, and
very quick, and examine their impact under an AS incident. Note that the base case is constructed
using the base parameter inputs as demonstrated in Table 2.3. During very slow we give the
largest share(42%) of civilian distribution to the very slow category, 4% to the slow category,30%
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Figure 2.15
Herding experiment results of 𝑉𝐻 vs. time

Figure 2.16
Herding experiment results of 𝑉𝐸 vs. time
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Figure 2.17
Herding experiment results of 𝑉𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 vs. time

to the average, 2% to the quick category, and 22% to the very quick category . The remaining
parameters (i.e. number of civilians, hiding capacity, etc.) stay as the base input values. During
slow labeled experiment we give 42% of civilian distribution to the slow category, 4% to the very
slow category,30% to the average, 2% to the quick category, and 22% to the very quick category.
During the quick labeled experiment we give 42% of civilian distribution to the quick category,
4% to the very slow category,30% to the average, 2% to the slow category, and 22% to the very
quick category .Finally during the very quick we give 42% of civilian distribution to the very quick
category, 4% to the very slow category,30% to the average, 2% to the slow category, and 22% to
the quick category .
Lesson 4: Initial distribution of civilians on the 1st or 2nd floor has a significant impact on the
number of civilians at risk and creates a drastic change in number of exited to number of hiding
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Figure 2.18
Cognitive delay experiment results of 𝑉𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 vs. time

Figure 2.19
Cognitive delay experiment results of 𝑉𝐻 vs. time
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Figure 2.20
Cognitive delay experiment results of 𝑉𝐸 vs. time

The results in figures 2.21,2.22, and 2.23 support this statement where we can see how the initial
distribution of civilians among the floors impact the performance measures,𝑉𝐻 , 𝑉𝐸 and 𝑉𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾 . In
addition to the distribution between the 1st and the 2nd floor being varied the hiding place capacity
was moved to 180 civilians to allow sufficient hiding capacity for all to hide.
Lesson 5: Optimization model is sensitive to the ML model being selected/considered
Logistic regression outperforms in reducing the number of at risk civilians but recall from
Table 2.2 that Logistic regression performed the best when considering accuracy of the trials run.
Logistic regression performed 3rd best for judging performance based upon the F score. While
the behavior of the civilians along the time periods are different the final result is within a few
percentage points of each other. For this reason there is no clear performance enhancement when
choosing among the three options.
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Figure 2.21
Distribution experiment results of 𝑉𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 vs. time

Figure 2.22
Distribution experiment results of 𝑉𝐻 vs. time
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Figure 2.23
Distribution experiment results of 𝑉𝐸 vs. time

Figure 2.24
Predictive algorithm experiment results of 𝑉𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 vs. time
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Figure 2.25
Predictive algorithm experiment results of 𝑉𝐻 vs. time

Figure 2.26
Predictive algorithm experiment results of 𝑉𝐸 vs. time
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2.4

Conclusions
The aim of this study was to extend the previous work done in the development of advanced

quantitative methods and modeling of active shooter scenarios. The first extension was to determine
which multi-class classification algorithm provide the best predictions for civilian movement within
an AS environment. We found that there are three that perform very similarly, KNN, random forest,
and logistic regression. The next extension was to model human/crowd behavior with herding.
Then to determine how it affects the amount of people that exit the system or find a safe hiding
place given limited hiding capacity. We found that herding does indeed increase the amount of
civilians at risk and needs to be used to make models more realistic.

2.4.1

Future Research

Going forward future research could be conducted to test varying corridor and public space
capacities. There can be only so many people in one location at a time. Our study also assumes
everyone can exit at the same time if needed. Restricting the flow may be interesting to see
especially when considering herding, door type and size. Lastly, the data set used was only for
university students. Most of the active shooter incidents happen in the high school level. Gaining
insights into how they would chose may be pivotal in making better model.
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